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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiffs-Appellees
CLOCK

are

purchasers

natural
of

persons,

WESLEY CLOCK and ANNE
husband

and

real property pursuant

wife,

and

to a written

"lease-option" agreement with the Defendants-Appellants
JOHN F GREEN and LARUE GREEN, natural persons, husband
and wife, as sellers thereto.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code, and
the "pour over" Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated
as of 2 March 1999, transferring this case to the Court
of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal and the predicate factual and legal
situation in which is arose presents the

following

issues:
1.

Whether the trial court misinterpreted

the contract

and/or misapplied

the law in

enforcing the same, by failing to give any
effect to the "selling price of $81,5000 at 10
1/2% interest" clause concerning the purchase
price if and when the "option" was actually
exercised and which characterized the purchase
transaction as "a loan".
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2.

Whether the trial court erred in failing

to

take

into

account

the

provisions

of

Sections 15-1-1, 15-1-3 and 15-1-4, Utah Code,
which require the assessment of interest on
judgments, especially when the contract upon
which the judgment was based provides

for

"interest",

the

at

forbearance

a

stated

amount,

transaction

on

which

was

characterized as a "loan".
The

construction

and

interpretation

of

an

unambiguous, written contract is a matter of law, to be
decided by the court. Kimball vs Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714
(Utah Supreme Court 1985); Morris vs Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah
Supreme Court 19 83).
Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is
a question of law. Wade vs Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah
Court

of Appeals

1994) ; Equitable

Life

&

Casualty

Insurance Company vs Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah
Court of Appeals 1993), cert denied 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
Supreme Court 1993).
Whether the trial court properly interpreted an
unambiguous contract is a question of law. Allstate
Insurance Company vs Liberty Mutual Insurance Group,
868 P.d 110, 112

(Utah Court of Appeals 1994); LMV

5

Leasing,

Incorporated vs Conlin,

805 P. 2d 189, 192

(Utah Court of Appeals 1991).
Whether the trial court properly interpreted (or
applied) a statute is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Ong International (U.S.A.), Incorporated
vs 11th Avenue Corporation,
Supreme

Court

Incorporated,

1993);

850 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah

Bennion

vs

Graham

Resources,

849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen

Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P.2d
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992).
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases
are reviewed for correctness. Wade vs Stangl,

869 P. 2d

9, 12 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); Allstate Insurance
Company vs Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, 868 P. 2d
111, 112 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994);.
This standard of review has also been referred to
as

a

"correction

of

error

standard".

Jacobsen

Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P. 2d
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992);
838

P.2d

1134,

1135

(Utah

Sanders vs Ovard,

Supreme

Court

1992);

Commercial Union Associates vs Clayton, 863 P. 2d 29, 36
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993).

"Correction of error"

means that no particular deference is given to the
trial court's ruling on questions of law.

Provo River

Water Users 7 Association vs Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931

6

(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Higgins vs Salt Lake County,
855

P.2d

231, 235

(Utah

Supreme

Court

1993).

The

"correction of error" standard means that the appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
law.

State vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433

(Utah Supreme

Court 1993); Howell vs Howell, 806 P.2d

1209, 1211

(Utah Court of Appeals 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July 1991 the Plaintiffs

Wesley Clock and Anne

Clock, husband and wife, as purchasers

[hereinafter

sometimes referred to as "the Buyers"]

negotiated

with

the

Defendants

John

Green

husband and wife, as sellers
referred

to

as

"the

and

LaRue

Green,

[hereinafter sometimes

Sellers"]

for

the

"option"

purchase of a parcel of improved residential property
located in Salt Lake County. A one-page, hand-written
agreement, consisting of a single paragraph of text,
was prepared and signed by the parties. The "option"
Agreement

[hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the

Agreement"]
provisions

contained
under which

certain

"lease-purchase"

the Buyers were

allowed

to

reside on the premises.
The 1991 hand-written "Agreement" in its entirety
provides:

7

7-29-1991
I Wesley Clock and Anne Clock agree to pay
$675.00 per month Plus Sewer and water. There
is a $350.00 deposit plus $1,000 for a lease
option to buy. Starting July 29, 1991 prorated
to Aug. 4, 1991, the selling price to be
$81500 at 10 1/2% interest. When option is
picked up, the $350.00 plus the $1,000.00 will
be applied to the down Payment of $5/000 or
more. The Seller will re-roof and make the
carport into a double garage, replace the back
door. Other than the things above, the Clocks
will take care of any repairs during the
option period. There will be a balloon payment
due on the balance of the loan Aug 5, 1996.
The rent to be pro-rated from July 29, 1991 to
Aug 4, 1991. Rent to begin on Aug 5, 1991.
August 2, $500.00; Aug 5, $700.00. Balance by
Aug 20, 1991. If the Clocks do not buy they
will be renters and Money will not be
refunded.
Is/ Anne Clock
/s/ Wesley Clock
/s/ John F. Green
/s/ LaRue Green
Emphasis added. [RECORD at 0005 and 0042.] [A photocopy
of the Agreement is included herein as ADDENDUM
Pursuant

to

the

"rental"

provisions

of

#1.]
the

Agreement, the Greens (as Sellers) allowed the Clocks
(as purchasers) to reside in the premises. During the
period 1991 to 1996, the Clocks "paid rent" to the
Greens. In April 1996 the Clocks notified the Greens
that

they

(the

Clocks)

intended

to

exercise

the

"option" for the purchase of the real estate. [RECORD
at 0007.] The Greens

citing the Clocks' failure to

make the required "down payment" in a timely fashion
and the Clocks' non-compliance with other provisions of
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the contract

refused to convey title to the real

estate, said refusal thus precipitating the instant
litigation.
The District Court initially adjudicated the case
pursuant to jointly-filed motions for summary judgment.
The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the basis
of their averments that they (as Buyers) had presented
a notice of intent to exercise the "option" within a
timely fashion. [RECORD at 0019 thru 0026; 0058 thru
0063.] The Defendants moved for summary judgment in
their

favor

on

the

basis

that

the

Plaintiffs'

notification was defective, in that the Plaintiffs were
in breach of the agreement because they had failed to
make the required down payment and because the option
was not exercised in a timely manner. [RECORD at 003 0
thru 0042.]
The specific issue of the price to be paid
required by the "at 10 1/2% interest" phrase
directly

as

was NOT

raised or adjudicated. The District

Court

ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. [RECORD at 0068 thru
0069.]

The

Defendants

appealed

the

1996

judgment.

[RECORD at 0074-0075.] The Utah Supreme Court "pouredover" [RECORD at 0077] the appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals, which issued an unpublished opinion, affirming
the

District

Court's

judgment

9

in

favor

of

the

Plaintiffs (purchasers). [RECORD at 81-82.] [A copy of
the original "MEMORANDUM DECISION" of the Court of
Appeals is attached hereto as APPENDIX 3.] The Utah
Supreme

Court

ultimately

denied

the

Defendant's

Petition for Writ of Certiorari. [RECORD at 83.]
Following the filing of the first appeal, the
Plaintiffs (as purchasers) took no action to comply
with

provisions

of

the

agreement

concerning

the

exercise of the "option" and/or the Court's judgment
upholding the option and its exercise. The Plaintiffs
tendered no money to the Defendants, although they
continued to reside upon the premises.
On remand, the District Court
of the Defendants (sellers)

over the objection

entered judgment against

the Defendants, ordering them to convey to the Buyers
the real estate, at the purchase price of $81,500.
[RECORD at 115-116.] [A photocopy of the 1998 "JUDGMENT

AND ORDER" is included herewith as ADDENDUM 4.] The "at
10 1/2% interest" clause (pertaining to the purchase
price) was given NO EFFECT by the trial court. This
latter judgment
appeal

which is the basis of the instant

failed to take into account the provisions of

agreement concerning the "at 10 1/2% interest" as such
affected
seemingly

(i.e. increased). The District Court also
ignored

the

contractual

10

provisions

characterizing the purchase transaction as a "loan".
The judgment

also failed to take into account

the

provisions of Sections 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, Utah Code,
pertaining to the assessment of any interest.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendants' arguments are summarized as follows:
1.

The "selling price of $81,500 at 10 1/2%

interest"

(emphasis added) is clear on its

face of the Agreement. Given the long-standing
rules

of

contract

construction,

this

unambiguous phrase must be given some meaning.
The ONLY meaning and application attributable
thereto is that the purchase price was to
increase at the rate of 10 1/2% per year. The
physical placement of the phrase within the
Agreement
grammatical

tends
and

to

that

syntax

conclusion;

connection

of

the
the

phrase to the "selling price" leads to that
single conclusion. The trial court ignored the
provision

and

awarded

judgment

without

reference thereto. The Plaintiffs-Appellants
(now standing to reap an unintended windfall)
desire to have the Court ignore and disregard
the provision. But the written text is there;
it cannot be ignored or explained away. Its

ll

import

must

be

incorporated

into

the

judgments.
2.

In similar vein, the trial court ignored

the pertinent Utah statutes which require that
judgments bear interest conforming to the
written agreements upon which those judgments
are based. The entered-judgment (upon which
this appeal is based) is absolutely void of
any provision which adheres to the statutory
mandate.
ARGUMENT
I
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE "AT 10 1/2% INTEREST" PROVISIONS
OF THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE SELLING PRICE
The

first

source

of

inquiry

in

a

contract

interpretation case is the document itself, considered
in its entirety. Hal Taylor Associates vs Unionamerica,
Incorporated, 657 P.2d 743 (Utah Supreme Court 1982);
Larrabee vs Royal Dairy Products Company, 614 P. 2d 160
(Utah Supreme Court 1980).

In interpreting the terms

of a contract, the reviewing court must look to the
agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature
and

purpose

of

the

contract. Utah

State

Medical

Association vs Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655
P. 2d 543 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) . The contract should
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be

interpreted

so

as

to

harmonize

all

of

its

provisions. Jones vs Hinkle, 611 P. 2d 733 (Utah Supreme
Court 1980) . If possible, ALL of the terms of the
contract should be given effect. G.G.A., Incorporated
vs Leventis, 773 P. 2d 841 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987) ;
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company vs Salt Lake City,
740 P.2d 1357 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987), certiorari
denied 765 P.2d 1277.
In the case at bar, there are at least FOUR EXPRESS
PROVISIONS which clearly indicate that the agreement
was to bear interest:
1.
The purchase price provision states: "the
selling price to be $81,500 at 10 1/2%
interest" .•.
2.
There is to be a "down payment of $5,000
or more" to be paid;
3.

There is to be a "balloon payment"; and

4.
The "balloon payment" is to be "due on
the balance of the loan".
From the text of the agreement itself, it clearly
appears the parties to the transaction contemplated a
"loan"-type transaction. And "loans" almost-universally
contemplate
payment

of

and,

as

interest

in

this

against

case,
the

SPECIFY

loaned

the

amount,

particularly when the contract says it so clearly!
[We are

NOT here

dealing

with

an

"ambiguity"

situation. The "10 1/2% interest" in connection with
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the "selling price" is unquestionably clear; it has but
one

interpretation.

The

Buyers

have

advanced

no

contradictory, reasonable meaning, interpretation or
application for the phrase "at 10 1/2% interest". Thus,
the rules of construction for "ambiguities" do NOT come
into play in the instant analysis.]
A
The Buyers have vigorously contested their desire
to enforce the "option" according to its terms, but now
seek to have the Court ignore
--the

"interest"

provisions

as the trial court didapplicable

to

the

transaction.
If the phrase "the selling price to be $81500 at
10 1/2% interest" doesn't mean that the selling price
is to increase

as the Sellers so contend

on an

annual basis, then what possible meaning does the
phrase "at 10 1/2% interest" mean? The Buyers advance
no reasonable interpretation,- they merely choose to
ignore the phrase. However, disregarding the phrase
does violence to the long-established rules of contract
interpretation: that ALL the provisions of the contract
be given meaning.
The trial court refused to give the phrase any
meaning. [Even if the trial court refused to give the
provision meaning during the "option period" (i.e. 1991
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to 1996) , there has to be at least some period of time
when the phrase has some effect. The case is almost
THREE YEARS AFTER the "option" has been "exercised".
Yet the Buyers have yet to fully tender the purchase
price! Even if the Court were to ignore the accrual of
interest during the 5-year option period (which, for
reasons outlined below, is contrary to the intentions
of the parties), the Court must

as a minimum

recognize that the contract provided for "10 1/2%
interest"

following

the

exercise

of

the

option.

Otherwise, the Buyers achieve an interest-free loan for
a three-year period or longer.
It is also incongruous to expect that the "at 10
1/2% interest" phrase applies to interest against the
selling price AFTER the "option" has been exercised. If
the "option" is properly exercised, the real estate is
promptly purchased and the Sellers are promptly paid:
there is no realistic opportunity for interest to ever
accrue (at least in meaningful amounts). Thus, the "at
10 1/2% interest" phrase was not contemplated by the
parties for the "post-exercise" situation; the only
other situation in which the phrase has any meaning or
application is those "pre-exercise" situations

the

situations in which the option is not exercised for a
considerable

time

following

15

the

execution

of

the

original contract. That is exactly what we have here
and that is exactly why the trial court should have
included the "interest" in the judgment(s) ordering the
sale.
That the parties agreed to the "10 1/2 interest"
to be applied to the "selling price", as applied from
the very beginning, can be discerned from the conduct
of the parties as well as the face of the document. If,
as the Buyers assert, the phrase has NO MEANING or
application
would

the

provision

(either pre-1996 or post-1996), then why
Sellers
in

the

go

to

such

contract,

What

extent

directly

the

to

the

price?

meaning

can

Sellers

so seemingly concerned about every dollar

provision

other

tied

put

purchase

the

possible

to

have?

meaning

Why

would

any
the

involved in the transaction that the parties "prorate"
the "rents" down to a five-day period, which apparently
increase from $500 per month (if paid on August 2nd) to
$700 (if paid on August 5th)? Why would the parties
and particularly the Sellers

worry about specifying

that the back door is to be repaired (at an undisclosed
price, but arguably measured at most in the couple
hundred dollar range), and then literally give away
tens

of

thousands

of

dollars

in

an

interest-free

"loan", for as long as five years (as the trial court
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originally ruled) and an ADDITIONAL THREE YEARS as the
Buyers would have the Court now rule?

[Against the

$81,500 "selling price", the "10 1/2% interest" for a
single year is approximately $8500; for the three years
1996

to

1999,

the

post-judgment

interest

accruing

against the "selling price" which still has NOT YET
BEEN PAID is in excess of $25,000! And that's $25,000
the Buyers don't want to pay! But its $25,000 that the
contract obligates them to pay. If the contract is not
so interpreted, then the rule of construction that "ALL
provisions of the contract" are to be given meaning (as
per Leventis, supra, and Big Cottonwood,

supra,) is

ignored.
B
Another method of approaching the transaction and
the meaning of the contract

and the operative effect

of its provisions, ALL of them

would be to engage in

a couple of hypothetical examples which illustrate, in
principle,

the

"at

10

1/2%

interest"

provision

applicable to the "selling price".
Hypothetical #1:
a

mere

two

The "option" is exercised

months

after

the

contract

is

signed. In this case, the purchase price is
essentially the $81,500 specified; the 10 1/2%
interest for 60 days is relatively minor. The
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Sellers get the $81,500, which they then can
invest

at prevailing

"market

rates" and

"life goes on" ! But their investment continues
to earn money.
Hypothetical #2:

The

Buyers

exercise

the

"option" a year later. They must pay about
$90,000 for the real estate. But that's the
price they'd pay

whether they or somebody

else was renting the property

for it anyway,

because that's what "the market" would demand!
Hypothetical #3 :

In this example, the Buyers

don't exercise the option for five years and
don't pay anything for three years afterward!
[That's

what

has

factually

happened

and

continues to happen, even now!] The Buyers
then purchase the residence in 1999
1999 "dollars"

using

for a purchase price set in

1991. It doesn't make sense! And not only does
it not make sense; such a result
what the Buyers now want

which is

goes against the

face of the very contract they seek to have
enforced!

[Under this

"hypothetical", the

Sellers lose $60, 000+, over an 8-year period! ]
Inflation

(albeit

in

moderate

rates)

and

appreciation of real estate in the Salt Lake Valley

18

have

been

a

"fact

of

life"

so

long

with

the

metropolitan Salt Lake City area that it is almost
counter-intuitive to deny their existence! That same
inflation and/or real estate appreciation could almost
be "judicially noticed". Why, then, is it so difficult
to factor such into the actual "selling price", when
the same is EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE FACE OF THE
AGREEMENT?

The phrase "selling price at 10 1/2% interest" must
be given meaning. The only reasonable meaning

from

the text itself and from the parties own external
conduct

is that it refers to the annual rate of

interest at which the "loan" was to be paid by the
Buyers. It can have no other reasonable meaning.
IF the Buyers are able to advance an interpretation
to the "10 1/2% interest" phrase (as connected to the
selling price) , we have the result that they are
allowed to purchase

now, in 1999

the real estate

for the price it would have sold for in 1991! The
phrase is simply ignored! On the other hand, if the
Sellers'

interpretation

is

followed,

the

Sellers

receive a reasonable return on their investment (i.e.
forbearance on the "loan"): 10 1/2%. That rate of
interest is not, per se, unreasonable or unrealistic;
the "statutory rate" at the time was (and is) 10% [per
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Section 15-1-1(2) , Utah Code. Thus, had the option been
exercised a year later (in 1992), the "selling price"
would be about $90,000. In 1993, it would be another
"10 1/2%" greater, about $98,500; in 1994, $107,000;
and so on. In 1999, the purchase price would have been
in

the

$130,000-range:

again,

reflective

of

the

inflationary or "appreciation" factors inherent in this
type of situation. If the Buyers' approach is followed,
the Sellers must sell in 1999 (or even 1996) at a price
in 1991 dollars; NO INTEREST is allowed, even though
the contract clearly provides for such, as tied to the
"selling price". On the other hand, if the Sellers'
interpretation is followed, the "selling price" is
approximately $130,000. Is such fair? Yes! Is it what
the contract, on its face, provides? Yes! Is it what
the parties reasonably agreed to? Yes!
Where courts have to choose between conflicting
interpretations to a contract, the interpretation which
will bring an equitable result will be preferred over
one which brings about an inequitable result. First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. vs Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078
(Utah Supreme Court

1983) . The interpretation and

approach advanced by the Buyers and adopted by the
trial court leads but to that inequitable result, that
the Sellers must, in 1999, accept $81,500 when the

20

contract provided they should receive about $13 0,000!
It's not reasonable to expect that for the mere
payment of a $1,350 the Buyers would be able to "lockin", for a five-year period, the purchase of the real
estate worth $81,500. The "five-year period" was, as
the previous decisions have affirmed, for the period in
which the "option" could be exercised; it is a totally
different thing to construe the contract to hold the
"selling price" constant for that entire 5-year (or, as
the situation has become, 8-year) period! Such flies in
the face of logic and CONTRADICTS THE CLEAR MEANING OF
THE WRITTEN TERMS!

C
A third approach is to attribute the 10 1/2%
interest to those amounts unpaid
interest

and thus accruing

from the 1996 "judgment" first entered by

the trial court, as to when the "option" was first
exercised. [In the intervening three years since that
exercise, the amount of the "interest" is substantial:
in excess of $25,000.]
D
In addition to the "contract" requirements, the
Court

should

impose

the

stated

(and

agreed-upon)

interest rate upon the unpaid balance (from the time
the option was exercised), as is required by statute,
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as explained in Point II, below.
II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE
FOR INTEREST ON THE JUDGMENT RESULTING FROM THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT OR UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE
It is without dispute that from 1991 to when the
"option"

would

be

"exercised",

the

Sellers

would

"forebear" in the receipt of monies as proceeds from
the sale of the home.
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code, provides:
(1) The
parties
to
a
lawful
contract may agree upon any rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods or chose in
action that is the subject of their
contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful
contract specify a different rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest
for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action
shall be 10% per annum.
Section 15-1-3, Utah Code, provides:
Whenever in any statute or deed, or
written or verbal contract, or in any public
or private instrument whatever, any certain
rate of interest is mentioned and no period of
time is stated, interest shall be calculated
at the rate mentioned by the year.
Emphasis added.
In

the

agreement

instant
specifies

situation,
"10

1/2%

the

"lease-option"

interest".

It

is

reasonable to construe the contract that the "selling
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price" is to be adjusted by that amount. [Whether the
transaction is also characterized as a "loan" probably
doesn't matter. What does matter is that the Agreement
clearly contains the provision and, in light of the
contract construction principles identified in Point I,
above, the provision MUST BE GIVEN SOME MEANING AND
EFFECT!]
Section 15-1-4, Utah Code, provides:
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful
contract shall conform to the contract and
shall bear interest agreed upon by the
parties, which shall be specified in the
judgment.
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at
the federal postjudgment interest rate as of
January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
Emphasis added.
The trial judge is required as a matter of law to
award the statutorily mandated rate of interest, even
though, with the passage of time, the award has become
large.

Mont

Trucking,

Incorporated

vs

Entrada

Industries, Incorporated, 802 P.2d 779 (Utah Court of
Appeals 1990) . Interest is allowed on debts overdue,
even in the absence of a statute or contract providing
therefor. Wasatch Mining Company vs Crescent Mining
Company,

7 Utah 8, 24 Pac. 586

(Utah Supreme Court

1890), affirmed 151 US 317, 38 L.Ed. 177 (1894). Under
the former provisions of Section 15-1-4
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(prescribing

the

rate

at which

"judgments

shall bear

interest"

unless otherwise agreed by the parties), the interest
follows the judgment as a matter of law and would be
collectible

even

though

the

judgment

did

not

so

provide. Dairy Distributors, Incorporated vs Local 97 6,
Western Conference of Teamsters, 16 Utah 2d 85, 3 96
P.2d 47 (1964). Where no tender of payment was made,
interest

accrued

on

a

money

judgment

during

the

pendency of a federal appeal and during efforts to
obtain further review by the United States

Supreme

Court. Woodmont, Incorporated vs Daniels, 290 F.2d 186
(10th Circuit 1961).
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Dairy Distributors, Incorporated vs Local Union 97 6,
Joint Council 87, Western Conference of Teamsters, 3 96
P. 2d 47 (Utah Supreme Court 1964) , is directly on point
and to be controlling. In Dairy Distributors the Utah
Supreme Court wrote:
Defendants appeal, contending that the
prior judgment, having been appealed and
affirmed by this court had become final, and
that the district court was thereafter without
authority to change it.
We have no doubt
about the correctness of the general rule that
when a judgment has become final, the court is
without authority to change it.
However, an
examination of the authorities cited by the
defendants will disclose that they do not
apply to situations such as the Instant one,
where there was merely a correction of an
inadvertent omission. Reece v. Knott, 3 Utah
451, 24 P. 757; Nichols v. Union Pac. Railway
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Co., 7 Utah 510, 27 P. 693; DaRouch v.
District Court, 95 Utah 227, 79 P.2d 1006, 116
A.L.R. 1147; Lees v. Freeman, 19 Utah 481, 57
P. 411; Frost v. District Court of the Fifth
judicial District, 96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737;
Keller v.
Chournos, 95 Utah 31, 79 P.2d 86,
will be found to actually support plaintiff's
position in recognizing that the interest
follows the judgment as a matter of law.
Our statute, Sec. 15-1-4, Utah Code Ann.
1953, provides that unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, » * * * judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of eight per cent per
annum." This interest follows the judgment as
a matter of law and would be collectible even
though the judgment did not so provide. See
Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d 260 (6th Circuit
1943) . The trial court in no way transgressed
its authority in filling in the omission and
making the record show what was true under the
law anyway. Its action was in conformity with
the well-established precept that mere lapse
of time will not prevent the court from
correcting errors or omissions.
We so
recognized in the recent case of Kettner v.
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, stating
that " * * * in proper circumstances where the
interests of justice so require, the court has
power to act nunc pro tunc, that is, to do an
act upon one date and make it effective as of
a prior date. It is recognized that clerical
errors may be corrected or omissions supplied
so the record will accurately reflect that
which in fact took place." To the same effect
see Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 195, 381
P.2d 78.
396 P.2d at 48. Emphasis added.
If the obligation
(first) judgment

to pay

interest

follows

the

"as a matter of law", then there

simply was no need to raise that issue at the first
appeal.
When Judge Wilkinson refused in 1998

following

remand subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision
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to

order the assessment of interest against the purchase
price to be paid (in 1998), the appealed issue became
"ripe".
The

irony

inherent

in

the

objection

of

the

Plaintiffs-Appellees as to the "interest" issue is the
fact that they struggled so hard to convince the Court
of Appeals that the "option" contract was enforceable,
according to its terms. The Court of Appeals accepted
that

argument

and

so

held.

Now

the

Plaintiffs-

Appellants want to ignore the "interest" provisions.
They (the Plaintiffs) have not been harmed at all.
They have been allowed
house, according

to the

since 1991

to live in the

"rental" provisions

(i.e.

payment of $675 per month). Since 1996 they have been
allowed

per the trial court's order

to live there

rent-free, for the last three years!
In the intervening three years that this case has
taken "on appeal", what should the purchase price
actually be? [As the Court interprets a contract "as a
matter of law", the framing of such a rhetorical
question

to illuminate the relevant considerations

and issues

is nevertheless appropriate.] Whether that

purchase price reflects the pre-1996 accruing interest
"at 10 1/2% interest" as the "option" contract clearly
states

is

one

question.

Whether
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the

"interest"

applies to post-1996 interest is a second
different

and totally

question. The Appellants are entitled to a

judicial decision on both.
That Judge Wilkinson of the trial court in 1996
refused to require interest at the "10 1/2% interest"
as the

contract

clearly provides

IS an

appealable

issue. [The "judgment" bears interest, "as a matter of
law", per Dairy Distributors,

supra.] That for the

intervening two years (1996 to 1998) NO interest was
included in the purchase price (finally paid in 1998,
but only if Plaintiffs hurry) is presently appealable!
The issue is not whether the judgment is "personal"
or for a "sum certain"; this issue is whether the
provisions

of

the

statute

will

be

followed,

by

incorporating the "10 1/2% interest" which so readily
appears on the face of the "option" agreement. That's
the issue. If the "10 1/2% interest" phrase does not
mean exactly this result, then what does the phrase
mean? The parties (in 1991) obviously had intended some
meaning

for

it!

What

simply

does

it

mean?

The

Plaintiffs, having prevailed on the enforceability of
the "option" agreement, cannot now be heard to complain
if the

"option" is enforced according to its clear

import!
The instant "appeal" might have the result that the
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Clocks might have to pay more than the $81,500 price
they agreed to in 1991, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT
THE

"OPTION"

HAPPEN!

CONTRACT

THEY

SIGNED

SAID

WAS

TO

That the purchase price would increase "at 10

1/2% interest".
So when they finally pay in 1999
years after

the 1996

latest

contemplated by the parties

date

date

more than three

(which was

the

absolute

as to the

transfer of the parcel), shouldn't the Buyers pay the
amount they agreed to? The Sellers think so, and have
filed this appeal to enforce the contract, according to
its terms.
It appears that Judge Wilkinson (and perhaps even
Plaintiffs' counsel) framed up the 1998 "judgment" so
as to avoid a situation wherein the Greens might refuse
to

sign

judgment

over

the

doesn't

necessary
require

conveyances.

that

they

do!

The

1998

The

1998

"judgment" provides the quiet title vesting upon the
deposit of the Plaintiffs' monies with Surety Title.
Those Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about
"delay" or "clouds on title", because the vesting of
time is entirely within their control!
If there is a res judicata or "law of the case"
concept applicable to the instant situation, it is that
the Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about
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the 1998 "judgment". They procured it. They prepared
it! That "judgment"

in procedure and substance

was

obviously designed to supersede and take the place of
the 19 96 "judgment".
CONCLUSION
The "option" Agreement clearly provides for the
incurring of "10 1/2% interest" against the specified
"selling

price"

for

the

real

estate.

The

ONLY

reasonable interpretation for the provision is that the
"selling price" increased, annually, at the "10 1/2%
interest" amount, until the option was exercised. [The
option is not fully exercised until the funds for the
purchase are actually received by the Sellers. Thus,
due to the fact that the Buyers still have not tendered
the agreed-upon amount, the "10 1/2% interest" still
continues to accrue.]
The relevant Utah statutes require the "judgment"
to

incorporate

the

"interest

rate"

stated

in

the

"contract" which is the basis for the judgment. Judge
Wilkinson's judgement does not do this. Accordingly, it
is the proper

subject

of an appeal

and

should be

corrected.
The Court of Appeals is entitled AND REQUIRED to
construe and interpret the written Agreement (and the
express provisions thereof) "as a matter of law" and
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without

any

deference

to

the

trial

court's

interpretation! The Court of Appeals should do so: TO
GIVE MEANING AND EFFECT to the phrase "selling price of
$81,500 at 10 1/2% interest".
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April,
1999.
lEN^QrHX

Attorney for Appellants
JOHN F GREEN and
LARUE GREEN
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be mailed, first-class postage
prepaid, certified mail, return-receipt requested, to
Mr Bryan W Cannon, Attorney at Law, 871 East 9400
South, Sandy, Utah
84070, this 13th day of April,
1999.
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ADDENDUM 1

1991 hand-written lease-option Agreement

ADDENDUM 2

19 96 JUDGMENT AND ORDER

ADDENDUM 3

1997 Court of Appeals MEMORANDUM DECISION

ADDENDUM 4

1998 ORDER ["JUDGMENT"]
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Third Juu.cialD.i.S

ScT 51996
1 LAKE COUNTY

BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 East South Temple #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3500

I N T H E T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T C O U R T
I N A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH
WESLEY CLOCK AND ANN CLOCK,

)

ORDER & JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960902949cv
vs.
JUDGE WILKINSON
JOHNF. GREEN AND LARUE
GREEN,
Defendants.
This matter came on regularly before the above-entitled court pursuant to
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment. Bryan W. Cannon appeared for the plaintiff at a hearing on the matter held
Friday, August 16, 1996 at 10:00 a.m. The defendants were represented by Craig W.
McArthur. Based upon the arguments of counsel, the memoranda submitted by the parties
and the court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby finds that the
Agreement is fully integrated with regard to the purchase price and the deadline date for
exercise of the option. The plaintiffs attempted to exercise the option for the option price
prior to the deadline date. Based upon the Court's finding, it is hereby ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED as follows:
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1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and defendants

Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
2.

The plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Anne Clock, are entitled to purchase

the property at 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah from defendants, John F.
Green and Larue Green.
3.

The defendants shall upon receipt of $81,500.00 convey the said real

property to the plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Anne Clock.
4.

Against the purchase price the defendants have received $1,300.00

toward the down payment thereon. The sum of $3,650.00 as additional down payment,
now held by the court, shall be paid to defendants, John F. Green and Larue Green, and
applied toward the purchase price, leaving a balance due thereon of $76,500.00.
5.

Any payments made by the plaintiffs to the defendants after August

4,1996 shall also be applied to the purchase price.
6.

Closing of the purchase shall occur within a reasonable time after the

entry of this order. Plaintiffs shall be obligated to set up and arrange at closing for the
purchase and defendants shall be obligated to appear at the closing, upon reasonable
notice to execute documents to transfer Wi\p.
DATED this

J

day of -August, 1996.

UDGE WILKlMSON
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FILED
OCT 0 2 1997
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Wesley Clock and Ann Clock,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.

Case No. 960797-CA

John F. Green and Larue Green,
Defendants and Appellants.

FILED
(October 2, 1997)

Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Bryan W. Cannon, Sandy, for Appellees

Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Greenwood.
DAVIS, Presiding Judge:
We interpret the option contract as a matter of law because
"the contract provision can be determined by the words of the
agreement." Estate of Schmidt v. Downs, 775 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Options contracts "must be exercised in
accordance with [their] terms." Nance v. Schoonover. 521 P.2d
896, 897 (Utah 1974), Here, the parties1 agreement does not
describe a separate time by which the Clocks were to exercise
their option. Yet "the failure to designate the time of payment
does not make the contract a nullity." Ferris V, Jennings, 595
p.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1979); see also ifofmann v. Sullivan/ 599 P.2d
505, 508 (Utah 1979) (concluding contract lacking specific time
of payment not fatally flawed where^ option price was fixed) .
Rather, "options to purchase that fail to specify mode of
exercise or time of payment must be read to require payment upon
exercise," Mills v. Brody. 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) .
The Clocks provided a notice of intent to exercise the
option in April 1996. Under the terms of the contract the Clocks
had until August 5, 1996 to pay the balance of the $81,500.
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Thus, the Greens breached the contract by refusing to sell the
propparTS^TNv Accordingly, the^yrder appealed from is affirmed.

James/£.Davis
Pr^kJCding Judj

WE CONCUR:

J u d i t h M. B i l l i n g s , Judge*"

£g*»to*^
/
Pamela T. Greenwood,

Judge

I, the undersig
Appeals, do
full, true and
on file In t
whereof, I
the Court

Date

960797-CA
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COURT

Third Judicial District

BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561
Attorney for Plaintiff
Aspen Plaza
871 East 9400 South
Sandy, Utah 84094
Telephone: (801) 255-7475

AUG 2 6 1998

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
WESLEY CLOCK and ANN CLOCK,
)
]

Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.

]i

Civil No. 960902949

JOHN F. GREEN and LARUE GREEN,

;1

JUDGE WILKINSON

Defendants.

]

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above entitled court on Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Contempt (a copy of which was not
served upon plaintift). The court being fully advised on the premises and based upon the
pleadings filed herein, hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are quieted in fee simple as to the following described real property
commonly known as 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah and more
particulary described as follows:
Lot 10, Olympus View Subdivision No. 3, according to the official
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plat thereof as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder.
Said real property shall hereby be quieted in the plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Ann
Clock, upon their deposit of the sum of $76,500 plus the sum of $3,650 now held
by the court with Surety Title Company.
2.

The sum of $3,650 now held by the court shall be released and made payable to
Surety Title Company.

3.

The sums of $76,500 plus the $3,650 transferred by the court shall be held by
Surety Title Company for the account of John F. Green and LaRue Green as the
purchase price of the above described real property.

4.

The issue of sanctions for plaintiff against defendant shall be reserved for later
determination.

5.

Evidence of the quieting of title in the plaintiffs shall be sufficient upon the
recording of a notice by Surety Title Company evidencing the deposit of the funds
required herein.

In connection with Defendant's Motion for Contempt, the same is denied. However,
plaintiffs are ordered to pay real property taxes from April \2y 1996 t6:date and water and sewer
fees from July 29, 1991 to date.

/ *'

^

- :'

,

'•

DATED t h i s j ^ day of August, 1998.

If ' ^3^
/ JODGE WIW&NSM
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